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I Introduction
In 1998, Taty Lieana Tearsa Sael filed a petition for asylum and
withholding of removal.' Ms. Sael was an Indonesian citizen who was
* Candidate for J.D., Washington and Lee University School of Law, May 2009; B.A.
Roanoke College, 2006. I would like to thank Professor Michelle Drumbl and Ben Conley for
their input and effort throughout this process.
1. See Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922, 924 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[Ms. Sael and her husband]
overstayed their visas, and responded to Notices to Appear by applying for political asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture.").
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ethnically Chinese and Christian.2 During her childhood in Indonesia, Ms. Sael
faced discrimination because of her race and religion.' As a young woman,
native Indonesians attacked the boarding house where she lived, vandalized her
car, and aimed racist remarks at her.4 On one occasion, she was riding in a taxi
with her native Indonesian husband when a mob threw rocks at the car upon
realizing that Ms. Sael was ethnically Chinese. In 1998, Ms. Sael and her
husband fled Indonesia and came to the United States.6 After they overstayed
their non-immigrant visas, Ms. Sael filed a petition for asylum and withholding
of removal.7 The Ninth Circuit found that Ms. Sael was eligible for asylum.
In 2003, Wan Chien Kho filed a petition for asylum and withholding of
removal. 9 Mr. Kho was an Indonesian national who was ethnically Chinese and
who converted to Christianity around 1992.10 As a child, Mr. Kho experienced
anti-Chinese discrimination at school." As a young adult, fellow bus riders
"heckled" him when he carried a Bible in public. 12 In 1996, a group of
Muslims robbed him.13 During anti-Chinese riots in 1998, Mr. Kho was hit in
the face when the store he worked in was robbed and looted. 14 Later that year,
2. Id. at 923.
3. See id. at 923-24 (describing the violence that occurred in Indonesia because of
Muslim-Chinese Christian tensions).
4. See id. at 927 (discussing the pattern of discrimination Ms. Sael faced in Indonesia).
The court stated:
[Ms.] Sael lived.., in a boarding house with many other residents but only one
other Chinese woman.... The two women received threats from native
Indonesians; their car was often vandalized, scrawled with sexist and racist
remarks... [and] a group stoned the boarding house... saying "the neighborhood
is not for the Chinese."
Id.
5. Id. at 928.
6. Id. at 924.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 929. The Ninth Circuit heard the case on appeal; initially, the immigration
judge granted Ms. Sael's asylum petition, but the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reversed
that decision. Id. at 923.
9. Kho v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 50, 52(1st Cir. 2007).
10. Id.
11. See id. ("School officials unsuccessfully tried to block his registration to public
elementary school.").
12. Id.
13. See id. ("In 1996, a group of men that Kho identified as Muslim robbed him on a side
street in Jakarta; Kho believes they targeted him because of his ethnicity.").
14. See id. at 52-53 ("In May 1998, violent anti-Chinese rioting took place in Jakarta. A
mob targeted a largely Chinese-owned shopping center where Kho operated an electronics store.
Rioters broke shop windows and looted goods from Kho's store; one looter hit Kho in the
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the Christian church that Mr. Kho attended was burned and destroyed. 15 The
following year, Mr. Kho's new church was also burned down.' 6 Mr. Kho fled
to the United States in 2001, and two years later he applied for asylum and
withholding of removal.' 7 The First Circuit upheld the immigration judge's
denial of asylum.
18
The above stories show how asylum applicants are treated differently
across the United States. Both Ms. Sael and Mr. Kho showed evidence that
they had experienced discrimination and persecution because of their race and
religion. Despite the similarity of the applicants' stories and that both based
their claims of persecution on their status as ethnically Chinese Christians who
feared returning to their native Indonesia, only one of them was granted asylum
and allowed to remain in the United States.' 9 This disparity resulted from
different interpretations of the statutory requirements for proving asylum across
the circuits.20
Asylum is a means by which an alien can remain in the United States
because of a fear of persecution upon return to his or her home country. An
alien is eligible for asylum if he is unable or unwilling to return to his home
country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,





18. Id. at 58. The immigration judge initially denied the application and the BIA upheld
that decision. Id. at 53.
19. Asylum is an area of immigration that is particularly inconsistent, even outside the
scope of the issue of the appropriateness of the disfavored group analysis. See, e.g., Jaya Ramji-
Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REv. 295,
302 (2007) (discussing a survey of asylum cases and the rate at which claims were accepted and
denied). The authors concluded that there is "remarkable variation in decision making from one
official to the next, from one office to the next, from one region to the next, from one Court of
Appeals to the next, and from one year to the next." Id. at 302. Despite the discrepancies that
seem to be a systematic failing of the asylum system, I suggest that the disparity that results
from different approaches to the disfavored group analysis is nonetheless an important issue.
First, the requirement for proving well-founded fear is central to asylum adjudication, because it
is the substantive element of an asylum claim that is based on the possibility of future
persecution. In addition, this is an area where reduced disparity is a realistic objective. Unlike
the disparity that results solely from the subjective and discretionary nature of asylum
procedures, the acceptance or rejection of the disfavored group analysis is relatively easy to
approach.
20. See infra Part IV (discussing the various interpretations by several circuits).
21. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (2000) [hereinafter
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the alien must establish either that he was the victim of individual,
particularized persecution or that a likelihood of future persecution exists
because of membership in a persecuted group.22
Some circuit courts have held that asylum applicants who are unable to
prove individual risk of persecution or membership in a group that is targeted
for systematic persecution may nonetheless qualify for withholding of removal
if they are members of a disfavored group.23 A disfavored group is one that is
not targeted for systematic persecution, but is at an increased risk of non-
systematic persecution.24  The disfavored group analysis essentially
incorporates a lower threshold standard for the withholding of removal, because
the asylum applicant can obtain asylum if he can show membership in a
disfavored group, accompanied by some lesser individualized risk of
persecution.2 5 Not all circuits have adopted the Ninth Circuit approach, and
variation in acceptance of the disfavored group analysis across the circuits
means that similar asylum applicants will be treated differently across the
United States. It is this variation that led to the different outcomes for Ms. Sael
INA].
22. In order to prove future persecution based on membership in a persecuted group the
applicant must show: (1) that in his country "there is a pattern or practice ... of persecution of
a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion," and (2) his own "inclusion in, and
identification with, such group of persons such that his or her fear of persecution upon return is
reasonable." 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii) (2008); see also id. § 208.16(b)(2) (setting forth a
similar standard for withholding of removal).
23. See generally Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[A]lthough members
of the disfavored groups are not threatened by systematic persecution of the group's entire
membership, the fact of group membership nonetheless places them at some risk."); Chen v.
INS, 195 F.3d 198, 203-04 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Individual targeting and systematic persecution do
not necessarily constitute distinct theories. Rather, an applicant will typically demonstrate some
combination of the two to establish a well-founded fear of persecution."); Makonnen v. INS, 44
F.3d 1378, 1383 (8th Cir. 1995) (explaining the disfavored group analysis).
24. See Kotasz, 31 F.3d at 853 ("[A]lthough members of the disfavored groups are not
threatened by systematic persecution of the group's entire membership, the fact of group
membership nonetheless places them at some risk.").
25. See id. (explaining that membership in a disfavored group combined with some
personal risk of persecution can satisfy the well-founded fear element). The court stated:
[A]lthough members of the disfavored groups are not threatened by systematic
persecution of the group's entire membership, the fact of group membership
nonetheless places them at some risk. That risk can rise to the level required for
establishing a well-founded fear of persecution either as a result of an individual's
activities in support of the group, or because an individual is a member of a certain
element of the group that is itself at greater risk of persecution than is the
membership of the group as a whole.
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and Mr. Kho. Ms. Sael was fortunate enough to fall under the jurisdiction of
the Ninth Circuit, the court where the disfavored group analysis originated. Mr.
Kho was not so lucky.
This Note explores the use of the disfavored group analysis in asylum and
withholding of removal cases. Part II introduces the asylum system, providing
the background information necessary to understand the disfavored group
analysis and the effect its acceptance will have on asylum cases. Part III looks
at the Ninth Circuit's creation of the disfavored group analysis and how the
Ninth Circuit has elaborated on and applied it. Part III then discusses how
other courts have adopted the disfavored group analysis. Part IV examines
those courts that have refused to adopt the disfavored group analysis and the
reasons they give. Part V explores the failed efforts to take the issue to the
Supreme Court. Part VI examines the statutory and regulatory provisions that
guide asylum, including a discussion of relevant legislative history, in order to
better determine whether the legislature meant to consent to an approach to
asylum cases that uses the disfavored group analysis. Finally, Part VII offers a
recommendation for absorbing the intent and design of the disfavored group
analysis into the current regulatory guidelines for asylum procedure. I suggest a
two-prong test that should be adopted by the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Service (USCIS). The test would allow an applicant to establish
well-founded fear of persecution based on membership in a disfavored group
combined with some individual risk of persecution. This conclusion is based
on the various courts' arguments, an interpretation of the relevant language in
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Code of Federal
Regulations (C.F.R.), and an understanding of the intent behind the American
asylum system.
I. Asylum
Asylum is a method through which an alien may be granted permission to
remain in the United States because of past persecution or a fear of future
persecution in his home country.26 Any alien present in the United States can
apply for asylum regardless of how he arrived in the country.2 In order to
obtain asylum, the applicant must establish that he is a refugee.28 A refugee is
26. See INA, 8 U.S.C. § 11 58(a)(1) (2000) (explaining that any applicant who establishes
that he or she is a refugee may obtain asylum).
27. Id. § 1158(a)(1).
28. See id. § 1 158(b)(l)(B) ("The burden of proof is on the applicant to establish that the
applicant is a refugee.").
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an alien who can show that race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion has or will result in persecution in
his home country.29 An applicant will qualify for asylum by establishing either
(1) past persecution due to his race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion; or (2) a well-founded fear of future
persecution based on at least one of those factors.30 In establishing a well-
founded fear of future persecution, the applicant must show that he fears
persecution if he returns to his home country, that his fear is reasonable, and
that he is unable or unwilling to return home because of this fear.3'
In order to establish a well-founded fear of persecution, the alien must
establish either that he was the victim of individual, particularized persecution
or that a likelihood of future persecution exists because of membership in a
systematically persecuted group.32 The applicant must prove a reasonable fear
of being singled out for individual persecution.33 It is not necessary that the
applicant prove that he will be singled out for persecution if he can show:
(1) that in his home country there is a pattern or practice of "persecution of a
group of persons similarly situated to the applicant on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion," and
(2) his own "inclusion in, and identification, with such group of persons" such
that there is a reasonable possibility that he would be threatened upon return to
29. See id. § 1 101(a)(42)(A) ("The term 'refugee' means... anyperson... who is unable
or unwilling to return to... [his] country [of nationality] because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.").
30. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (2008) ("The applicant may qualify as a refugee either
because he or she has suffered past persecution or because he or she has a well-founded fear of
future persecution.").
31. See id. § 208.13(b)(2)(i) (explaining what is necessary to obtain asylum based on a
well-founded fear of future persecution). The regulation states:
An applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution if: (A) The applicant has a fear
of persecution in his or her country of nationality.., on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; (B) There
is a reasonable possibility of suffering such persecution if he or she were to return
to that country; and (C) He or she is unable or unwilling to return to, or avail
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of such fear.
Id.
32. See id. § 208.13(b) ("Eligibility. The applicant may qualify as a refugee either
because he or she has suffered past persecution or because he or she has a well-founded fear of
future persecution.").
33. See id. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii) (explaining when it is not necessary that the applicant prove
that he will be singled out for persecution, and demonstrating that individualized risk is
necessary in all other circumstances).
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that country.34 The applicant carries the burden of showing a reasonable
possibility of persecution.35 Courts have not clearly defined what constitutes a
reasonable possibility of persecution.
A type of relief that is closely intertwined with asylum is withholding of
removal. Withholding of removal is a method through which an alien who is
otherwise removable may be able to obtain relief if his life or freedom would be
threatened upon removal.36 An asylum application is also an application for
withholding of removal.37 Like asylum, withholding of removal is established
when the alien shows that he has "suffered past persecution in the proposed
country of removal on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion."38 Withholding of removal may
also be based on future persecution; however, the standard of proofwith regard
to future persecution is higher for a withholding claim than an asylum claim.
To obtain withholding of removal based on a future persecution, the alien must
"establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be persecuted on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion upon removal ....
There are a few key differences between asylum and withholding of
removal. Asylum is within the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland
34. Id.
35. See id. § 208.13(b)(2)(i) ("An applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution
if:. . . There is a reasonable possibility of suffering... persecution if he or she were to return
to that country.").
36. See id. § 208.16(b) ("The burden of proof is on the applicant for withholding of
removal.., to establish that his or her life or freedoms would be threatened in the proposed
country of removal on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.").
37. See id. § 208.13(b) ("An asylum application shall be deemed to constitute at the same
time an application for withholding of removal.").
38. Id. § 208.16(b)(1)(i).
39. Id. § 208.16(b)(2). Like asylum, withholding of removal requires that the applicant
prove either that he will be singled out for persecution, or that there is a pattern or practice of
persecution against a particular group in his home country and that he will be persecuted
because of such membership if he returns to his home country. Id. The rule states:
The asylum officer or immigration judge shall not require the applicant to provide
evidence that he or she would be singled out individually for ... persecution if:
(i) The applicant establishes that in that country there is a pattern or practice of
persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion; and (ii) The applicant establishes his or her own inclusion in and
identification with such group of persons such that it is more likely than not that his
or her life or freedom would be threatened upon return to that country.
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Security or the Attorney General, whereas withholding of removal is
mandatory.40 In addition, asylum is easier to prove because it requires only a
reasonable possibility of future persecution, whereas withholding of removal
requires that persecution upon return to the home country be more likely than
not.41 Finally, the panoply of rights that accompanies a successful asylum
claim is greater than that accompanying withholding of removal.42 These
differences are procedural; the substantive elements of both forms of relief are
the same-both require either past persecution or an individualized or group-
based risk of future persecution. Because the disfavored group analysis focuses
on the risk of future persecution, the differences between asylum and
withholding of removal are not central to the courts' analyses and are not the
focus of the disfavored group analysis case law.43 Where the differences affect
the disfavored group analysis or the relevant discussion, explanation of the
differences will be included to ensure clarity.
Asylum is a particularly timely issue in the American immigration system.
The number of asylum petitions has increased drastically in the past twenty
years. In 1990, 8,472 applicants obtained asylum.44 By 2001, that number had
risen to 38,825. 45 Although the number fell to 26,113 in 2006,46 the USCIS is
still receiving and processing asylum claims at rates far out-pacing its activity
40. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1 158(b)(l)(A) (2000) (stating that either cabinet member "may
grant asylum") (emphasis added) with 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(d)(1) (2008) ("[A]n application for
withholding of deportation or removal to a country of proposed removal shall be granted if the
applicant's eligibility for withholding is established.... ").
41. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2) (2008) (An applicant ... may demonstrate that his or her
life or freedom would be threatened in the future in a country if he or she can establish that it is
more likely than not that he or she would be persecuted... upon removal.").
42. For example, asylees are able to adjust status to legal permanent residency after one
year. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b)(2) (2000). There is no similar guarantee for those granted
withholding.
43. The key differences between the asylum and withholding of removal claims are
procedural. If the asylum officer or immigration judge who is considering the application or
petition finds that the applicant has not met his burden of proof to establish a reasonable
possibility of persecution, asylum will be denied. Id. § 1 158(b)(l)(B). The alien will also be
automatically denied withholding of removal, because his inability to prove a well-founded fear
means that he will be unable to meet the higher burden of proof necessary to obtain withholding
of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b) (2008). If the asylum officer or immigration judge finds that
the alien is eligible for asylum, it is within his discretion to grant asylum. Id. § 208.14(a). If the
asylum officer or immigration judge acts within his or her discretion to deny asylum, the alien
can pursue the withholding of removal claim; if he is able to meet the higher burden of proof, he
is automatically granted withholding of removal. Id. § 208.16(d).
44. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTIcs, 2006 YEARBOOK OF
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level eighteen years ago. With its rising popularity as a method for attempting
to obtain the protection of the United States, the asylum system can benefit
from greater uniformity.
I1. Applying the Disfavored Group Analysis in Asylum Cases
Some courts have held that asylum applicants who are unable to prove
membership in a group that is targeted for systematic persecution may
nonetheless qualify for withholding of removal if they are members of a
"disfavored group., 47 A "disfavored group" is one that is not targeted for
systematic persecution, but whose members are at an increased risk of non-
systematic persecution.48 Introduced by the Ninth Circuit and referred to as the
disfavored group analysis, 49 this approach balances the risk of group-based
persecution and evidence of particularized persecution: The greater the risk of
persecution because of membership in a group, the less extensive the evidence
of particularized persecution necessary for asylum must be.50 This approach in
essence institutes a lower threshold standard for the withholding of removal,
because the asylum applicant need not show that he will be specifically targeted
for persecution or that he is a member of a group that faces systematic
persecution in his country of removal. Instead, the applicant can show some
membership in a disfavored group, accompanied by some degree of
persecution. The degree of individual persecution necessary to obtain asylum
will vary depending on the group, and the level of persecution it faces as an
entity.
A. The Disfavored Group Analysis in Kotasz v. INS
The Ninth Circuit first articulated the disfavored group analysis in Kotasz
v. INS.51 In Kotasz, a Hungarian family applied for asylum based on their
47. See supra note 23 and accompanying text for a description of courts' adoption of the
disfavored group analysis.
48. See Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[A]lthough members of the
disfavored groups are not threatened by systematic persecution of the group's entire
membership, the fact of group membership nonetheless places them at some risk.").
49. See, e.g., Kho v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2007) (discussing the Ninth
Circuit's "disfavored group" analysis).
50. See Kotasz, 31 F.3d at 853 ("[T]he more egregious the showing of group
persecution-the greater the risk to all members of the group--the less evidence of
individualized persecution must be adduced.").
51. See id. at 855 (holding that the BIA should analyze petitions for asylum under the
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status as gypsies.52 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied the
application, finding that neither Mihaly Kotasz nor his wife had been
individually targeted or singled out for persecution in Hungary. 53
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding that the BIA erred in
requiring Mr. Kotasz to show particularized persecution.54 The court explained
the statutory and regulatory requirements for proving well-founded fear.55 The
novelty of the Kotasz opinion came in the next part of the decision, where the
Ninth Circuit explained that the two ways to establish a well-founded fear are
inadequate in dealing with the realities of global persecution.56 The court
acknowledged that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had made
a valid effort to deal with the problems of major group oppression, but that
oppression rarely meets the level of systematic persecution that would satisfy
correct standard of particularization, which considers possible membership in a disfavored
group).
52. Id. at 849.
53. See id. at 850 ("The immigration judge found [Mr. Kotasz's] testimony generally
credible, but denied the Kotaszes' asylum and withholding of deportation claims and granted
them voluntary departure. The BIA affirmed in a three-page disposition."). The judge
examined the facts alleged in the asylum claim, noting that Mr. Kotasz was arrested in Hungary
as a result of his protest of the communist government and was forced to serve briefly in a labor
camp because of his refusal to serve in the military. Id. at 849-50. During the hearing, Mr.
Kotasz also described the current political situation in Hungary and the fact that he would
continue to face difficulty if he returned to Hungary because of his past political activities. Id.
at 850. The court stated: "Mihaly testified at much greater length, describing his mistreatment
at the hands of the Hungarian government. He asserted that because of his past political
activities he would have 'great difficulty' if he returned to Hungary." Id. With regard to Mr.
Kotasz's arrests and forced labor at the hands of the Hungarian government, the BIA noted that
because he was arrested with a handful of other demonstrators, he was never singled out for
persecution: "[T]he BIA stated.., that 'there is no evidence in the record that [he] was singled
out for persecution-rather, he was arrested with numerous other demonstrators and
incarcerated for a short period of time."' Id. (alteration in original).
54. See id. at 849 ("[T]he BIA erred in its application of the requirement of a
particularized threat of persecution.").
55. See id. at 851-52 (explaining that an asylum applicant can prove status as a refugee
based on a well-founded fear of persecution in two types of situations). The court stated: "A
requirement that the alien show that he faces a particularized threat of persecution-sometimes
referred to, especially in BIA opinions, as a requirement that the alien show that he will be
'singled out' for persecution-is encompassed within the well-founded fear standard." Id
Alternatively, the applicant can show a reasonable likelihood that he will be persecuted upon
return home because of his membership in a group that suffers from a pattern of persecution. Id.
at 852. "There are, in contrast, more extreme situations in which members of an entire group--
though perhaps not of an entire nation-are systematically persecuted. In such cases, group
membership itself subjects the alien to a reasonable possibility of persecution." Id.
56. See id. at 853 (explaining that non-systematic persecution is more common than
pattern persecution against members of oppressed groups).
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the requirement of a pattern of persecution. 7 According to the Ninth Circuit,
there is a level of persecution that falls between being individualized and
systematic; this level of persecution is not so particularized as to be an example
of singling out an individual, yet the persecution does not rise to the level of
being a pattern or practice against such a group.58 The court referred to this
persecution as attacking "disfavored groups," whose members do not face a
pattern of systematic oppression but are nonetheless persecuted for their
membership in the group. 59 Thus, the court argued, the plain language of the
well-founded fear element of asylum omits a large class of aliens who
reasonably face the possibility of persecution if they return to their home
countries.6 °
Based on this view, the Ninth Circuit proposed an approach that would
allow an applicant to obtain asylum based on membership in a disfavored
group. According to this approach, membership in a disfavored group, though
not necessarily putting the alien at risk of systematic persecution, nonetheless
puts the alien at risk of persecution. 6' The court explained that in some cases
membership in a disfavored group would be adequate in proving well-founded
fear of persecution and obtaining asylee status, if the applicant was a member
of a faction that is at particular risk.62 In other cases, the court put forward a
sliding-scale approach in determining whether an alien established well-
founded fear.63 The court explained:
[The] risk can rise to the level required for establishing a well-founded fear
of persecution either as a result of an individual's activities in support of
the group, or because an individual is a member of a certain element of the
57. See id. ("Although past and even present-day events show that the INS has rightly
attempted to deal with the problem of systematic persecution of members of oppressed groups,
the problem of non-pattern and practice persecution of members of such groups is far more
common.").
58. See id. (explaining that disfavored groups are oppressed but are not subject to a
pattern of persecution, and that individual members face more targeted persecution).
59. See id. ("[M]embers of the disfavored groups are not threatened by systematic
persecution of the group's entire membership, [but] the fact of group membership nonetheless
places them at some risk.").
60. See id. (asserting that many refugees who are not in danger of systematic persecution
are still at a high risk because of their membership in a particular group).
61. See id. (explaining that membership in a disfavored group puts an applicant at an
increased risk of persecution upon return to his home country).
62. See id. at 854 ("In some cases, of course, where persecution of the subgroup is
systematic, the subgroup member may meet his burden of showing a well-founded fear of
persecution simply by showing membership in the subgroup.").
63. See id. ("[T]he categories of group targeting and individual targeting are not absolute
and distinct. In most cases, they co-exist.").
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group that is itself at 1eater risk of persecution than is the membership of
the group as a whole.
The court went on to explain that membership in a disfavored group that
experiences some persecution, coupled with some degree of individualized
persecution, may establish the well-founded fear of persecution necessary to
obtain asylum. 65 The court discussed this coupling as a sort of balancing
approach: The greater the persecution against the disfavored group of which
the alien is a member, the less evidence of individualized persecution is
necessary. 66
B. The Disfavored Group Analysis Applied
The Ninth Circuit has fully embraced the disfavored group analysis since
Kotasz. In Sael v. Ashcroft,67 the Ninth Circuit explained that where an asylum
applicant has not been subjected to individual persecution, he can establish a
well-founded fear of persecution upon removal either by showing membership
in a group subject to a pattern of persecution or by showing membership in a
disfavored group coupled with some individual risk of persecution.
68
According to the court, "[t]he [disfavored group] claim consists of two
elements-membership in a 'disfavored group' and an individualized risk of
being singled out for persecution-that operate in tandem.
6 9
The Ninth Circuit recently reaffirmed its loyalty to the disfavored group
analysis in Lolong v. Gonzales.70 The court in Lolong also elaborated on the
requirements that must be met in order for asylum to be granted based on
membership in a disfavored group. The court explained that membership in a
disfavored group alone is not sufficient to show well-founded fear:
64. Id. at 853.
65. See id. at 854 (explaining the application of the disfavored group analysis).
66. See id. ("In the non-pattern or practice cases, there is a significant correlation between
the asylum petitioner's showing of group persecution and the rest of the evidentiary showing
necessary to establish a particularized threat of persecution.").
67. See Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the petitioner, an
Indonesian who was ethnically Chinese Christian, had a well-founded fear of persecution).
68. See id. at 925 (stating that an asylum applicant can demonstrate well-founded fear by
showing patterned persecution against a group in which the applicant is a member).
"Alternatively, an applicant may prove that she is a member of a 'disfavored group' coupled
with a showing that she, in particular, is likely to be targeted as a member of that group." Id.
69. Id.
70. See Lolong v. Ashcroft, 400 F.3d 1215, 1225 (9th Cir. 2005) ajfden banc, 484 F.3d
1173 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the applicant, an Indonesian Christian who was ethnically
Chinese, showed substantial evidence supporting her asylum petition).
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If the applicant demonstrates that she is a member of a "disfavored group,"
but the group persecution does not rise to the level of a pattern or practice
of persecution, then the applicant must also demonstrate that she is more
likely to be targeted as a member of that group.7'
In rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit gave further explanation.72 The court
clarified that in past cases where applicants obtained asylum based on
membership in a disfavored group, the applicant also showed some evidence of
individual risk upon removal.73 The court differentiated between cases where
the applicant claims membership in a group subjected to patterned persecution
and those who claim membership in a disfavored group, explaining that some
individualized risk is necessary to obtain asylum based on the latter but that
individual risk is irrelevant in the former.74
The Fourth and Eighth Circuits have also expressed support for the
disfavored group analysis.75 The Fourth Circuit embraced the disfavored group
71. Id. at 1219.
72. See Lolongv. Ashcroft, 484 F.3d 1173, 1178, 1181 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding
that the Ninth Circuit had jurisdiction to reinstate a removal order and that the petitioner failed
to show an objective fear of persecution and therefore did not prove a well-founded fear of
persecution).
73. See id. ("[In past cases] the petitioner had presented some evidence that he or she
faced a unique risk of persecution upon return that was distinct from the petitioner's mere
membership in a disfavored group.").
74. See id. (explaining that certain evidence that is not applicable in examining the
validity of an asylum claim based on some level of individual risk of persecution may be
relevant where the applicant seeks asylum based on membership in a group subject to patterned
persecution). This explanation helps in our understanding of well-founded fear as a continuum.
On one end there is the asylum claim entirely based on individual persecution. On the other end
is the claim based on membership in a group subject to a pattern of persecution. Membership in
a disfavored group puts an applicant somewhere in between the two extremes. The more similar
the applicant's disfavored group is to those groups subject to patterned persecution, the less a
showing of individualized risk is necessary. Likewise, the greater the individual risk posed by
membership in the disfavored group, the less a showing of systematic persecution against the
group is necessary. Id.
75. See Chen v. INS, 195 F.3d 198, 204 (4th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the requirement that an
asylum applicant show either particularized persecution or membership in a systematically
persecuted group). "[A] stronger showing of individual targeting will be necessary where the
underlying basis for the applicant's fear is membership in a diffuse class against whom actual
persecution is haphazard and rare." Id.; see also Makonnen v. INS, 44 F.3d 1378, 1383 (8th
Cir. 1995) (explaining the disfavored group analysis). The court stated:
In such cases, "although members of the disfavored groups are not threatened by
systematic persecution of the group's entire membership, the fact of group
membership nonetheless places them at some risk. That risk can rise to the level
required for establishing a well-founded fear of persecution either as a result of an
individual's activities in support of the group, or because an individual is a member
of a certain element of the group that is itself at greater risk of persecution than is
the membership of the group as a whole."
1761
65 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1749 (2008)
analysis in asylum cases in Chen v. INS,76 where the court considered a petition
for asylum and withholding of removal based on a claim that the Chinese
petitioner, who had three children, would be subjected to involuntary
sterilization upon a return home based on China's one-child policy.77 The BIA
found that Chen had no objective reason to fear individualized persecution on
the basis of his violation of the one-child policy and denied his petition.78
In considering whether to uphold the BIA's denial of asylum, the Fourth
Circuit explained that the petitioner can prove well-founded fear by
demonstrating that he or she has been individually targeted for persecution or
that he or she is a member of a group against which there exists a pattern of
persecution.79 The court then went one step further and embraced the Ninth
Id. (quoting Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 1994)).
76. See Chen, 195 F.3d at 205 (holding that petitioner alien Yong Hao Chen failed to
show well-founded fear of persecution and upholding denial of asylum and withholding of
removal). Chen and his wife claimed that they faced pressure in China to abort their first child,
born in May 1990; they avoided the abortion by paying government officials and also agreed to
avoid future conception and to sterilization, though neither was sterilized. Id. at 200. The
couple's second child together was born in the United States, and they claimed they would face
repercussions if they returned to China with this child. Id. They introduced a 1995 report by
Human Rights in China describing the consequences for violations of the "one child" rule. Id.
at 200-01. The INS responded with a report demonstrating that forced abortions and
sterilization were declining in China and that couples returning home from study abroad were
generally not penalized. Id. at 201.
77. See id. at 200 ("Chen maintains that he is entitled to refugee status because he has a
well-founded fear, based on China's 'one child' population control program, ofbeing subjected
to an involuntary sterilization procedure, or of being persecuted for a refusal to undergo such a
procedure."). The Fourth Circuit agreed that Congress explicitly included in its 1996 definition
of "refugee" in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)
those persecuted for violations of family planning policies, in response to the BIA's original
policy of rejecting such claims. Id. at 201. The court said that such discrimination would be
considered persecution on account of political opinion and could allow the alien to meet the
well-founded fear prong of the asylum cases. Id. The Act states: "[A] person who has a well
founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo [an abortion or involuntary sterilization] or
subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well
founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion." INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)
(2000). Petitioner Chen claimed that, because of this definition, he had a well-founded fear of
forced sterilization based on his political opinion and was therefore entitled to withholding of
removal. Chen, 195 F.3d at 201.
78. See id. at 202 ("[T1he judge found that Chen did not qualify for asylum ... because he
was unable to establish that his fears of persecution and involuntary sterilization are objectively
reasonable.").
79. See id. at 201-02 (describing the statutory elements of a successful asylum claim).
The court stated:
The [INA] provides the Attorney General with discretion to grant asylum to any
alien who is a 'refugee,' ... a person unable or unwilling to return to his home
country 'because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
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Circuit's interpretation of the INA from Kotasz, explaining that the petitioner
can prove well-founded fear by demonstrating that he or she falls somewhere in
between individualized and patterned persecution. 0 Citing Kotasz, the court
stated:
[T]he more egregious the showing of group persecution... the less
evidence of individualized persecution must be adduced.... Conversely, a
stronger showing of individual targeting will be necessary where the
underlying basis for the applicant's fear is membership in a diffuse class
against whom actual persecution is haphazard and rare.
8 1
Despite the court's adoption of the Ninth Circuit's disfavored group analysis, it
upheld the BIA's rejection of Chen's asylum petition.82 The court explained
that the State Department report on China's "one-child" policy showed
diminished levels of retaliation against those who violated the policy, and that
the haphazard nature of the persecution against violators required that Chen
introduce evidence of individual persecution targeting him and his wife. 3 The
court said that such evidence was lacking, and thus Chen was not entitled to
asylum or withholding of removal.8 4 Thus, the Fourth Circuit's application of
the disfavored group analysis shows that where there is a risk of persecution
based on group membership but the persecution is not systematic in nature, a
greater showing of individual risk is necessary.
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion'....
Id. at 201 (quoting INA, 8 U.S.C §§ 158(b), 101(a)(42) (2000)). "The 'well-founded fear of
persecution' standard contains a subjective and an objective component.... An applicant may
satisfy the subjective element by... demonstrating a genuine fear of persecution." Id. "The
objective element requires the asylum petitioner to show, with specific, concrete facts, that a
reasonable person in like circumstances would fear persecution." Id. at 202.
80. See id. at 203-04 ("Individual targeting and systematic persecution do not necessarily
constitute distinct theories. Rather, an applicant will typically demonstrate some combination of
the two to establish a well-founded fear of persecution.").
81. Id. at 204 (citation omitted).
82. See id. ("In this case.., we must conclude that substantial evidence supports the
Board's decision.").
83. See id. ("The Chinese government... impose[s] these measures in a far from
systematic way, and with decreasing frequency. As a result, an applicant must proffer some
additional evidence that his fears.., are objectively reasonable.").
84. See id. at 204-05 (explaining that Chen failed to establish that his fears were
objectively reasonable). The court stated that "[a]t most, a reasonable factfinder would be
compelled to conclude that Chen faces the possibility of incurring fees associated with the cost
of housing and educating his son." Id. at 205.
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In Makonnen v. INS,85 the Eighth Circuit considered an application for
asylum founded on a claim of ethnic-based persecution. In upholding the
immigration judge's rejection of the asylum petition, the BIA articulated its
interpretation of the standard for proving a successful asylum claim, explaining
that the INA required that Petitioner Makonnen show either individualized
persecution or that all members of her ethnic-based political group face
persecution.86 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit said that the BIA erred when it
failed to consider Makonnen's well-founded fear once it was established that
she was not singled out for persecution and there was no pattern of persecution
against all Oromo.87 The court referred to the Ninth Circuit's Kotasz opinion
and explained that an alien may meet the requirements for asylum even if the
group in which he is a member is not subject to patterned persecution. 88 The
Eighth Circuit looked to where the BIA had grounded its explanation in the
language of the INA, which says that an asylum applicant need not show he
would be singled out for persecution if he can show membership in a group
against which there is a pattern or practice of persecution in his home country.89
The court said that the BIA had adopted too restrictive a definition of "pattern
or practice," and that the language should be read broadly so that a petitioner
might still be able to prove a well-founded fear of persecution with evidence of
some group persecution combined with some individual persecution. 90 In
adopting the disfavored group analysis, the court explained:
85. See Makonnen v. INS, 44 F.3d 1378, 1383 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that the BIA erred
in its failure to consider petitioner's well-founded fear of persecution even if the petitioner is
unable to prove either individual persecution or membership in a group against which there is a
pattern of persecution, and remanding to the BIA to consider petitioner's additional evidence).
The Ethiopian petitioner, Elizabeth Makonnen, claimed that membership since childhood in the
Oromo Liberation Front, a political group that opposed the Marxist Mengistu government,
would cause her to be persecuted upon her return to Ethiopia. Id. at 1380.
86. See id. 1382-83 ("The Board... not[ed] that Makonnen... 'does not demonstrate a
well-founded fear of persecution within the meaning of the [INA] unless there is some evidence
that [Makonnen] will be singled out for persecution or that all members of the Oromo ethnic
group are being persecuted."'). The petitioner was an active member of the Oromo Liberation
Front, an Ethiopian political group that has rallied for autonomy in Ethiopia's southern region
for over three decades. Id. at 1381.
87. See id. at 1383 ("[F]or the Board to construe the regulation to require a showing of
persecution of all the members of the applicant's group represents an unreasonable reading of
the 'pattern or practice' language.").
88. See id. (citing the Ninth Circuit Kotasz decision to explain that "the [INA] leaves the
standards governing non-pattern or practice cases to be developed through case law").
89. See id. (describing the BIA's analysis and its reference to the language of the INA).
90. See id. ("The Board also failed to consider whether Makonnen might have a well-
founded fear of persecution even if she is unable to establish a pattern or practice of persecution
of the Oromo people or of the OLF.").
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[A]lthough members of the disfavored group are not threatened by
systematic persecution of the group's entire membership, the fact of group
membership nonetheless places them at some risk. That risk can rise to the
level required for establishing a well-founded fear of persecution either as a
result of an individual's activities in support of the group, or because an
individual is a member of a certain element of the group that is itself at
greater risk of persecution than is the membership of the group as a
whole. 9'
The court remanded the case to the BIA to apply the disfavored group analysis
in considering whether Makonnen had a well-founded fear of persecution.
92
The Fourth and Eighth Circuits' respective adoptions of the analysis
provide good examples for implementation. In rejecting the asylum petition in
Chen v. INS, the Fourth Circuit articulated what would be necessary for a
successful claim, explaining that the group at issue was large and disconnected
and that persecution was not only non-patterned but no longer common.93
Where this situation exists, a strong showing of individualized persecution
would be necessary; the court denied petition for asylum in Chen because the
petitioner failed to make this showing.94 The Eighth Circuit's decision in
Makonnen explains the application of the disfavored group analysis where an
alien's particular status in a group that is not systematically persecuted might be
the basis for a successful asylum claim.95 There, the court suggested that it was
not petitioner Makonnen's OLF membership alone that made a fear of
persecution upon return to Ethiopia reasonable, but her active participation in
group activities and leadership role that put her at special risk.96  These
explanations of how the disfavored group analysis is applied are helpful in
determining whether it can be consistently applied.
91. Id. The court also noted that Makonnen's fear seemed to be based not just on her
membership in OLF, but on her active role in the group since childhood. Id.
92. See id. at 1384 ("We hold that the BIA was incorrect as a matter of law in suggesting
that it must be shown that all ethnic Oromos were being persecuted, in not considering the
possibility of non-pattern-and-practice persecution .... ).
93. See Chen v. INS, 195 F.3d 198,204 (4th Cir. 1999) ("The Chinese government and its
local agents, according to the State Department, impose these measures in a far from systematic
way, and with decreasing frequency.").
94. See id. at 204-05 ("[An applicant must proffer some additional evidence that his
fears of this policy are objectively reasonable.... Taken as a whole, the record does not compel
the conclusion that Chen reasonably fears [substantial economic disadvantage] because of his
decision to have a third child.").
95. See Makonnen v. INS, 44 F.3d 1378, 1383 (8th Cir. 1995) (explaining that
membership in a faction within a disfavored group that is at particular risk can prove a well-
founded fear of persecution).
96. See id. at 1384 ("[I]t appears Makonnen bases her claim primarily on her active
membership in the OLF.").
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IV. Rejecting the Disfavored Group Analysis in Asylum Cases
Despite its acceptance by the Fourth and Eighth Circuits, the disfavored
group analysis has been soundly rejected by the First, Third and Seventh
97Circuits. In Lie v. Ashcroft, the Third Circuit considered a claim by an
Indonesian national that she would be persecuted upon return home because
she is an ethnically Chinese Christian. 98 After agreeing with the BIA that Lie
had failed to show a well-founded fear of future persecution because she and
her family would either suffer individualized persecution or were members of a
group that was subjected to a pattem or practice of persecution in Indonesia, the
Third Circuit considered the disfavored group analysis.99 The Third Circuit
explicitly rejected the disfavored group analysis: "We disagree with the Ninth
Circuit's use of a lower standard for individualized fear absent a 'pattern or
practice' of persecution and, similarly, we reject the establishment of a
'disfavored group' category."' t ° The court did not discuss the disfavored group
analysis further in the opinion.
In Firmansjah v. Gonzales,l0 ' the Seventh Circuit considered the
disfavored group analysis. In explaining why Firmansjah, an ethnically
Chinese Indonesian national with residency in Singapore, had failed to meet the
requisite burden of proof for a successful asylum claim, the court noted the
Third Circuit's approach in Lie and contrasted the Ninth Circuit's approach to a
97. See Kho v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 50, 55 (lst Cir. 2007) (rejecting the disfavored group
analysis); Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 538 (3d Cir. 2005) (rejecting the disfavored group
analysis, which according to the Third Circuit lowers the standard for particularized persecution
despite the lack of evidence of membership in a systematically persecuted group); Firmansjah v.
Gonzales, 424 F.3d 598, 607 n.6 (7th Cir. 2005) ("This circuit has not recognized a lower
threshold of proof based on membership in a 'disfavored group."').
98. See Lie, 396 F.3d at 538 (holding that Petitioner Lie, an Indonesian, failed to establish
a well-founded fear of persecution based on her Christian religion and Chinese ethnicity). See
supra Part I for a further discussion of the facts in Lie.
99. Id. at 535-37 (explaining why Lie's evidence failed to establish a well-founded fear of
future persecution). The court discussed Sael v. Ashcroft, a factually similar Ninth Circuit case
where the petitioner was also an Indonesian citizen who was ethnically Chinese and Christian.
Id. at 538. The Sael court applied the Kotasz disfavored group analysis and said that because
Chinese Christians in Indonesia constitute a disfavored group, less individualized persecution
need be shown in order to render an alien eligible for asylum. Id. The Third Circuit in Lie
refused to apply the Ninth Circuit standard. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Firmansjah v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 598, 607 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that
substantial evidence supported the immigration judge's decision that the petitioner had failed to
show a well-founded fear of persecution). Like the petitioner in Lie, the petitioner filing for
asylum in Firmansjah was an Indonesian national of Chinese ethnicity. Id. at 600.
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similarly-situated applicant in Sael. 102 The Firmansjah court explained how the
Ninth Circuit had used the disfavored group analysis in Sael, stating that "[t]he
Sael court concluded that 'ethnic Chinese [were] significantly disfavored in
Indonesia,' and then required the applicant to demonstrate a "'comparatively
low" level' of risk in order to establish a well-founded fear of persecution."
0 3
The court explained that the Ninth Circuit in Sael had loosened its requirement
of individualized persecution where the alien showed membership in a
disfavored group. °4 The court was explicit in its rejection of the disfavored
group analysis: "This circuit has not recognized a lower threshold of proof
based on membership in a 'disfavored group."' 105 The court cited the Third
Circuit decision in Lie, but gave no further explanation for its rejection of the
disfavored group analysis.'
0 6
The First Circuit recently joined the Third and Seventh Circuits in
rejecting the disfavored group analysis. In Kho v. Keisler,'0° the First Circuit
considered an asylum petition filed by an Indonesian citizen who claimed a fear
of persecution based on his status as an ethnically Chinese Christian.'0 8 After
briefly describing the disfavored group analysis, 09 the court flatly refused to
apply the disfavored group analysis and stated that "[i]n rejecting the
'disfavored group' standard, we join other circuit courts that have rejected the
use of a lower standard for individualized fear absent a pattern or practice of
persecution and rejected the establishment of a disfavored group category."'
l10
The court was harsh in its rejection of the analysis, and believed that the Ninth
102. See id. at 607 (contrasting the Third and Ninth Circuits' approaches to the well-
founded fear of persecution standard).
103. Id. at 607 n.6.
104. See id. ("Sael required an even lower level of individualized risk after finding that the
applicants were members of a 'disfavored group."').
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Kho v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 50, 54-55, 58 (lst Cir. 2007) (holding that there is no
patterned persecution against ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and that the BIA did not err in finding
that petitioner Kho had not suffered persecution in Indonesia). The Court rejected the
disfavored group analysis and the contention that there is a presumption of credibility when the
petitioner claims membership in a disfavored group. Id. at 55-56.
108. See supra Part I for a further discussion of the facts in Kho.
109. See id. at 55 ("Under the Ninth Circuit's 'disfavored group' rule, asylum applicants
who have not shown a pattern or practice of persecution under Section 208.16(b)(2) but have
shown membership in a group that is disfavored are subject to a lower burden of showing an
individualized risk of threats to their lives ...
110. Id.
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Circuit acted outside its authority in expanding the methods by which an
applicant can obtain asylum beyond the scope of the INA."'
V The Supreme Court Has Refrained from Considering the
Disfavored Group Analysis
The cases show that there is a split among the circuits in their acceptance
and rejection of the disfavored group analysis. Despite the split, the Supreme
Court has declined to resolve the issue, denying certiorari petitions that raise
the issue. In 2005, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Camara v.
Gonzales,12 a case from the Third Circuit where the petitioner argued that the
circuit split demanded that the Supreme Court establish a consistent standard."
3
In 2007, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Avetisian v. Gonzales,1 4 a
petition from the Ninth Circuit.' In Avetisian the petitioner stated:
To prove the objective component of well-founded fear, and thereby
asylum, Ms. Avetisian needs to prove either (1) that there is "a pattern or
practice" of persecution, or else (2) that she is a member of a "disfavored
group" and she is within a sub-group of the disfavored group that faces
heightened persecution."16
111. See id. (explaining that courts that apply the disfavored group analysis act outside the
scope of the authority they have received from Congress). The court stated:
While Congress has delegated the authority to the Attorney General and the
Secretary of Homeland Security to establish regulations in this area, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1103, it has made no such delegation to the courts. The disfavored group analysis
works a subtle alteration of the usual standards of review. We are bound by the
standards Congress sets.
Id.
112. See Camara v. Gonzales, 110 F. App'x 262,265 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S.
977 (2005) (holding that the BIA's denial of asylum and withholding of removal for a petitioner
from Cote d'Ivoire based on her membership in a political party should be upheld).
113. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Camarav. Gonzales, 544 U.S. 977 (2005) (No.
04-1159) ("The federal courts of appeals adjudicate thousands of petitions for review
challenging denials of asylum or requests for withholding of removal every year. For reasons of
both judicial efficiency and basic fairness, the rules governing such adjudications should be
uniform throughout the nation.").
114. See Avetisian v. Gonzales, 206 F. App'x 711,712 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.
Ct. 2946 (2007) (holding that the BIA's denial of asylum and withholding of removal for an
Armenian petitioner should be upheld).
115. Id.
116. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 23, Avetisian v. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 2946 (2007)
(No. 06-1365) (including an incorrect labeling of the petitioner as "Ashcroft").
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In both Camara and Avetisian, the Attorney General waived response. 17
Most recently, the court denied certiorari for an appeal from the Seventh
Circuit. In Sanusi v. Gonzales," 8 the Seventh Circuit denied review of the
immigration judge and BIA decisions to deny asylum to an Indonesian woman
who claimed that she would be persecuted upon return to Indonesia because she
was a Christian of Chinese ethnicity. 19 In his petition for writ of certiorari,
petitioner Sanusi argued that the Supreme Court should resolve the supposedly
clear split among the circuits with regard to the disfavored group analysis.1
20
Petitioner Sanusi explained that the inconsistency in application of the
disfavored group analysis will render decisions regarding asylum and
withholding of removal claims unreliable, and will lead aliens to be treated
differently depending on where they are located.1
2'
In response, the Attorney General claimed that the split among the circuits
regarding the disfavored group analysis is not as clear as the petitioner
alleged. 22 The Attorney General said that neither the Eighth nor the Fourth
Circuit has actually "embraced" the disfavored group analysis. 123 The Attorney
General explained that no court was willing to allow membership in a
disfavored group alone to establish proof of a well-founded fear of persecution,
and that therefore the disfavored group analysis had not spread beyond the
117. See Waiver of Right of Respondent Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney Gen. to Respond at
1, Avetisian, 127 S. Ct. at 2946 (waiving the respondent's right to respond to the petition for
writ of certiorari); Waiver of Right of Respondent Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney Gen. to
Respond at 1, Camara, 125 S. Ct. at 1861 (waiving the respondent's right to respond to the
petition for writ of certiorari).
118. See Sanusi v. Gonzales, 188 F. App'x 510, 513 (7th Cir. 2006), cert denied, 127 S.
Ct. at 2935 (2007) (holding that Indonesian petitioners who were ethnically Chinese and
Christian did not show a "clear probability" of persecution upon return to Indonesia).
119. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Sanusi v. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 2935 (2007)
(No. 06-1094) (stating that the Seventh Circuit denied review).
120. See id. at 11 ("The federal courts of appeals are irreconcilably split over the issue of
whether a showing of membership in a 'disfavored group' still requires an applicant to show
actual individualized persecution to establish eligibility for withholding of removal.").
121. See id. at 17 ("[H]ad Sanusi's application for withholding been presented to an IJ
[Immigration Judge] whose immigration court is under the jurisdiction of the Fourth, Eighth or
Ninth Circuit court of appeals, she would have received a different outcome on her case.").
122. See Brief for Respondent at 10, Sanusi, 127 S. Ct. at 2935 (No. 06-1094) ("[T]here is
no conflict in the circuits on the question of whether membership in a disfavored group alone,
without any individualized evidence of persecution, is sufficient to establish a well-founded fear
or likelihood of persecution.").
123. See id. at 11-12 (explaining that the Fourth and Eighth Circuits have not "embraced"
the disfavored group analysis, and that the Fourth Circuit, though quoting from the Ninth
Circuit Kotasz case, did not grant asylum based on the disfavored group analysis).
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Ninth Circuit.124 The Attorney General also noted that the Ninth Circuit agrees
that membership in a disfavored group alone is not enough to establish proof of
a well-founded fear of persecution.125 Thus, because there is no clear circuit
split, according to the Attorney General, there is no need for the Supreme Court
to resolve the issue.'
26
While the Attorney General in Sanusi was correct to argue that no circuit
has held that membership in a disfavored group is sufficient to create the well-
founded fear necessary for a successful asylum claim, this argument misstates
the disfavored group analysis. In Lolong v. Gonzales, which the respondent
cited for the proposition that an alien is not "eligible for asylum 'absent an
individualized risk of persecution,"' the Ninth Circuit said that membership in a
disfavored group alone is not adequate to establish a well-founded fear. 27 The
Ninth Circuit explained that they have never granted asylum based entirely on
the petitioner's membership in a disfavored group.' 28 In successful asylum
cases, the alien has shown both membership in a disfavored group coupled with
some risk of individualized persecution. 29 In his petition, Sanusi phrased the
issue as whether an "asylum applicant... who has demonstrated membership
in a 'disfavored group' ... will not be found to have shown a well founded fear
of persecution unless she can also demonstrate that she has been 'singled out'
for persecution."' 30 It was in response to this description of the disfavored
group analysis that the Attorney General argued that the disfavored group
analysis has not actually been embraced by the Fourth and Eighth Circuits. The
disfavored group analysis as formulated by the Ninth Circuit in Kotasz does
require that the petitioner make some showing of an individualized risk of
124. See id. at 11 ("IN]either the Fourth nor the Eighth Circuit has held that membership in
a 'disfavored group' obviates the need to establish an individualized risk of persecution.").
125. See id. at 10 ("The en banc Ninth Circuit recently revisited its precedent and...
reaffirmed that aliens are not eligible for asylum 'absent an individualized risk of persecution or
a pattern and practice of persecution."') (quoting Lolong v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 1173, 1181 (9th
Cir. 2007)).
126. See id. ("[T]here is no conflict in the circuits on the question whether membership in a
disfavored group alone, without any individualized evidence of persecution, is sufficient to
establish a well-founded fear or likelihood of persecution.").
127. See Lolong v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 1173, 1181 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the
Ninth Circuit has never granted asylum where the claim was entirely based on membership in a
disfavored group without any evidence of individual persecution).
128. See id. (stating that past successful asylum claims included some individual threat
separate from membership in the disfavored group).
129. See id. (explaining that the disfavored group analysis requires some individualized
threat of persecution).
130. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Sanusi v. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 2935 (2007) (No.
06-1094).
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persecution. The level of risk necessary for a successful asylum petition
corresponds to the level of risk stemming from membership in the disfavored
group.13 1 Thus, despite the stance of the Attorney General in his Sanusi brief,
circuits are split over the legitimacy of the disfavored group analysis.
VI. Statutory and Regulatory Guidance
In order to determine whether the disfavored group analysis is appropriate
in asylum decisions, it is necessary to look at the legislation and administrative
rules that govern the asylum procedure. When it was originally passed in 1952,
the INA allowed individuals fleeing persecution to come to the United States
and included an immigrant preference category for individuals fleeing
persecution from communism.1 32 The Refugee Act of 1980, however, was the
first statute that created a legal framework for refugees and asylees in
accordance with international guidelines.1 33 The Refugee Act is based largely
on the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
(Convention). The definition of "refugee" in the Refugee Act is almost
identical to the one in the Convention.
34
The current statutory basis for asylum is found in the INA. 35  As
originally passed in 1980, the provision gave no guidance as to how asylum
would be granted or what the procedural requirements for an asylum claim
were.1 36 The statute instructed the Attorney General to establish an asylum
131. See Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he more egregious the
showing of group persecution-the greater the risk to all members-the less evidence of
individualized persecution must be adduced.").
132. See INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (repealed 1980) (allowing persecution-fleeing
individuals to come to the United States).
133. See id. § 1101 (revising the INA to provide for a uniform refugee assistance
procedure).
134. See United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S 137 (defining a refugee). The Convention definition of a refugee is one who:
Owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events,
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Id..
135. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2000) (defining asylum, setting the conditions for granting
asylum and establishing procedure for asylum cases).
136. See id. (commanding the Attorney General to establish a procedure for granting
asylum).
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procedure and stated that the Attorney General would have discretion to grant
asylum once the applicant proved that he met the definition of a refugee.' 37 In
its current form, the INA gives both the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and the Attorney General discretion to grant asylum once an applicant
has shown that he is a refugee, but it provides very little guidance as to how the
decision should be made. 138 The statute explains that the applicant has the
burden to prove that he is a refugee, and states that the applicant is a refugee if
he can "establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for
persecuting the applicant.'0 39 The statute gives no further direction in how to
determine whether the applicant has established that he is a refugee under the
INA. Thus, the INA guides the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
Attorney General only with the actual definition of a refugee. A refugee is
defined as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in
the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which
such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return
to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of,
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.140
The language of the INA provides little assistance in determining the
appropriateness of the disfavored group analysis in asylum cases. The INA
tells the decision maker that asylum may be granted where the applicant is a
refugee, but does not explain how the applicant can show that he has a "well-
founded fear" that satisfies the INA. Thus, the statute does not help in the
determination of whether the applicant can show a well-founded fear based on
137. See id. (creating an asylum institution for aliens already within the United States).
The statute stated:
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically present in
the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of such alien's
status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of
the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee
within the meaning of section 101 (a)(42)(A).
Id.
138. See id. ("The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General may grant
asylum to an alien... if the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General determines
that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 101 (a)(42)(A).").
139. Id.
140. Id. § l101(a)(42)(A).
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membership in a disfavored group combined with some individual risk of
persecution.
Congress's intent when it drafted the asylum provision of the Refugee Act
of 1980 provides little help in determining how an applicant will be able to
show well-founded fear. The Senate Report discusses the procedural elements
of the Refugee Act and explains that the Attorney General will establish a clear
and uniform procedure for adjudicating asylum claims.14 1 With respect to
obtaining asylum, the Report simply states that asylum may be granted to those
aliens who fit within the United Nations definition of a refugee. 142 The Report
says nothing about the role of the asylum program within the larger refugee
framework in the United States, thus providing no guidance about whether the
definition of "refugee" for purposes of asylum will be narrow or broad in scope.
The House of Representatives Report provides even less light into Congress's
intent, simply stating that "the Attorney General [is directed] to establish a new
uniform asylum procedure." 1
43
Additional sources of procedural and substantive rules for asylum claims
are the administrative rules and adjudications promulgated and decided by the
executive agencies that implement immigration law. Because Congress
provided so little guidance for the determination of asylee status, the INS' 44
established procedures for making asylum determinations in 1990."
45
141. See S. REP. No. 96-256, at 9 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 149-50
("[T]he bill establishes an asylum provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act for the first
time by improving and clarifying the procedures for determining asylum claims filed by aliens
who are physically present in the United States.").
142. See id. at 9 ("[A]sylum will continue to be granted only to those who qualify under the
terms of the United Nations Protocol relating to the status of refugees.").
143. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 96-781, at 20 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 160,
161.
144. The INS, a former agency within the Department of Justice, is the predecessor to the
current federal immigration service and enforcement agencies. See Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 8 U.S.C. § 1551 (2000) ("There is created and established in the
Department of Justice an Immigration and Naturalization Service."). The INS was dissolved in
2003, when the DHS was created and immigration jurisdiction was divided among the branches.
See 6 U.S.C. § 291(a) (2000 & Supp. 112002) ("[T]he Immigration and Naturalization Service
of the Department of Justice is abolished."). Immigration services and enforcement were
divided among three branches: Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS),
Bureau of Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), and Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE). Id. §§ 201-271. The agency that issues rules that would amend the asylum
and withholding of removal rulings at issue here is CIS, which is the service arm of the
immigration regulation system. Id. § 271. Because much of the relevant asylum statutes and
regulations were passed when the INS still oversaw immigration, much of this section refers to
the INS.
145. See Aliens and Nationality; Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Procedures, 55
Fed. Reg. 30,674-01 (July 27, 1990) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 3, 103,208, 236, 242, and 253)
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According to the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), the applicant will qualify
for asylum by establishing either (1) past persecution due to his or her race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion; or (2) a well-founded fear of future persecution based on at least one
of those factors.146 This language comes from the definition of a refugee in the
INA. 47 The requirements for proving a well-founded fear of persecution,
however, are found only in the CFR.148 The CFR states that:
An applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution if: (A) The applicant
has a fear of persecution.., on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; (B) There is a
reasonable possibility of suffering of such persecution if he or she were to
return to [his or her] country; and (C) He or she is unable or unwilling to
return to, or avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country
because of such fear. 1
49
This language expands upon the INA's definition of a refugee, with the
addition of a standard of a reasonable possibility. The CFR goes on to state:
The immigration judge shall not require the applicant to provide evidence
that there is a reasonable possibility he or she would be singled out
individually for persecution if: (A) The applicant establishes that there is a
pattern or practice in his or her home country... of persecution of a group
of persons similarly situated to the applicant on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion,
and (B) The applicant establishes his or her own inclusion in, and
identification with, such group of persons such that his or her fear of
persecution upon return is reasonable.'
50
The language of the CFR requires that in order to have a well-founded fear, the
applicant must either face individual persecution or be a member of a group
that suffers a pattern of persecution. The language does not allow an applicant
to establish a showing of well-founded fear based on some combination of
(establishing asylum procedures).
146. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (2008) ("The applicant may qualify as a refugee either
because he or she has suffered past persecution or because he or she has a well-founded fear of
future persecution.").
147. See INA, 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (2000) ("The term 'refugee' means.., any
person... who is unable or unwilling to return to... [his or her] country [of nationality]
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.").
148. See supra Part II for a detailed explanation of the requirements.
149. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2) (2008).
150. Id. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii); see also id. § 1208.16(b)(2) (requiring the same standards for
withholding of removal).
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individual risk and group persecution. Thus, it appears that the disfavored
group analysis is not an appropriate approach to well-founded fear according to
the language of the CFR as promulgated by the INS.
Although the language of the CFR does not explicitly support the
disfavored group analysis, the intent of the INS may have been to allow an
approach to well-founded fear that was broad in scope. The INS's intent in
drafting the provisions of the Code can be found in the final rule promulgated
in 1990.51 This rule was promulgated to "establish[] procedures to be used in
determining asylum... and withholding of deportation."'152 The rule describes
the statutory framework within which it would operate. 5 3 In describing the
motivation behind the Refugee Act and the rule that expounded upon it, the
INS explained that:
[The asylum] policy reflects two basic guiding principles: A fundamental
belief that the granting of asylum is inherently a humanitarian act distinct
from the normal operation and administration of the immigration process;
and a recognition of the essential need for an orderly and fair system for the
adjudication of asylum claims.1
54
These two principles demonstrate the intent of both Congress and the INS in
creating a procedure for individuals who fear persecution to obtain refuge in the
United States. Beyond this articulation of the rule's intent, however, the
analysis of the asylum provision provides no indication that an applicant can
prove a well-founded fear of persecution based on membership in a disfavored
group combined with some level of individual risk of persecution.
155
VII. Recommendation: A Disfavored Group Test
The well-founded fear standard articulated by the INS in the CFR,
requiring the asylum applicant to show either membership group subject to
patterned persecution in his home country or an individualized risk of
persecution, is inadequate. The objective of the asylum system is to provide
151. See Aliens and Nationality; Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Procedures, 55
Fed. Reg. 30,674-01 (July 27, 1990) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 3, 103, 208, 236, 242, and 253)
(establishing asylum procedures).
152. Id. at30,675.
153. See id. ("The Refugee Act of 1980 created a statutory basis for asylum in the United
States.... In passing the Act, Congress for the first time established a statutory definition of
refugee.").
154. Id.
155. See id. at 30,683 (stating the an applicant need not show individual risk of persecution
if he can show membership in a group subject to patterned persecution in his home country).
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safety to aliens who fear persecution. 5 6 As the INS explained in the
background material it provided when promulgating its final asylum procedure,
"the granting of asylum is inherently a humanitarian act." 57 The current well-
founded fear standard, however, does not meet this objective because it denies
asylum to applicants who face persecution upon removal to their home country.
As the Ninth Circuit said in Kotasz, there are aliens who fall between the two
methods of proving well-founded fear who are nonetheless at the same risk of
persecution as successful asylum applicants. 158 The Ninth Circuit explained
that "[a]lthough past and even present-day events show that the INS has rightly
attempted to deal with the problem of systematic persecution of members of
oppressed groups, the problem of non-pattern and practice persecution of
members of such groups is far more common."' 59 The court went on to say that
"categories of group targeting and individual targeting are not absolute and
distinct."'160 Thus, a modification to current well-founded fear standard as
articulated by the INS is necessary in order to more fully meet the aim of the
asylum system.
The disfavored group analysis was one effort to ameliorate the harshness
of the regulatory standard. The original disfavored group analysis as it was
understood by the other circuit courts that either embraced or rejected it,
however, is too lenient and unclear. First, the Ninth Circuit did not clearly
define a "disfavored group" in Kotasz. The court simply explained that
"although members of the disfavored group are not threatened by systematic
persecution of the group's entire membership, the fact of group membership
nonetheless places them at some risk.' 16' The Ninth Circuit also said in Kotasz
that "the problem of non-pattern and practice persecution of members of
[oppressed] groups is... common."'162 Thus, the only explanation for what
constitutes a disfavored group is a group that is oppressed, but whose members
do not face systematic, patterned persecution. This explanation leaves much
room for subjectivity and discretion in judicial application, particularly because
the INS does not define a "pattern or practice" of persecution in its procedural
156. See HuMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ASYLUM: SAFETY & FREEDOM IN AMERICA 2 (2005)
(explaining the American asylum system and its goals).
157. Aliens and Nationality; Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Procedures, 55 Fed.
Reg. 30,674-01 (July 27, 1990) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 3, 103, 208, 236, 242, and 253).
158. See Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that most persecution
based on group membership is not patterned persecution).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 854.
161. Id. at 853.
162. Id.
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guidelines for asylum. In addition, the disfavored group analysis as originally
articulated seemed to allow an applicant to obtain asylum based solely on
membership in the disfavored group. Specifically, the court in Kotasz stated:
In such cases, although members of the disfavored groups are not
threatened by systematic persecution of the group's entire membership, the
fact of group membership nonetheless places them at some risk. That risk
can rise to the level required for establishing a well-founded fear of
persecution either as a result of an individual's activities in support of the
group, or because an individual is a member of a certain element of the
group that is itself at reater risk of persecution than is the membership of
the group as a whole.
The Ninth Circuit in Kotasz appeared to assert that something more than
membership in a disfavored group would be necessary only in some cases and
did not clearly explain when such cases would arise.' 64 The closest the court
came to asserting that a successful asylum claim should show both group and
individual risk was its statement that:
In the non-pattern or practice cases, there is a significant correlation
between the asylum petitioner's showing of group persecution and the rest
of the evidentiary showing necessary to establish a particularized risk of
persecution. Specifically, the more egregious the showing of group
persecution-the greater the risk to all members of the group--the less
evidence of individualized persecution must be adduced.li'
Since its inception, however, the disfavored group analysis has been
clarified by the Ninth Circuit in a manner that has effectively narrowed its
original meaning as understood by other courts. In 2007, the Ninth Circuit in
Lolong elaborated on the requirements that must be met in order for asylum to
be granted based on membership in a disfavored group. The court explained
that membership in the disfavored group is not sufficient to show well-founded
fear, stating:
If the applicant demonstrates that she is a member of a "disfavored group,"
but the group persecution does not rise to the level of a pattern or practice
of persecution, then the applicant must also demonstrate that she is more
likely to be targeted as a member of that group.1
66
The Ninth Circuit's recent articulation of the disfavored group analysis explains
that the applicant must show membership in a disfavored group and some
163. Id.
164. See supra Part IH.A (discussing the Kotasz decision).
165. Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 853-54 (9th Cir. 1994).
166. Lolong v. Ashcroft, 400 F.3d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 2007).
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individual risk of persecution. The persecution against the group need not rise
to the level of being systematic, and the individual risk need not rise to the level
of that necessary to prove well-founded fear based on individual risk alone.
Rather, the applicant must show that he falls somewhere between the two
statutory alternatives for proving a well-founded fear of persecution, by
showing some degree of each. This is a standard that is somewhat narrower
than that originally understood to be the disfavored group analysis.
Even in its clarified and narrowed form, however, the disfavored group
analysis is still imprecise. The Ninth Circuit's articulation in Lolong provides
no further guidance to asylum officers and reviewing courts as to what groups
are disfavored and what correlation of individual risk is necessary to establish
in the alien a well-founded fear of future persecution. The Ninth Circuit has
never articulated a clear test for how the disfavored group analysis is to be
applied. In addition, the BIA has not articulated a version of the disfavored
group analysis for use by its asylum officers, nor has the DHS promulgated a
rule clarifying how, or even whether, the asylum applicant can establish well-
founded fear based on membership in a disfavored group.
In addition to the imprecise nature of the Ninth Circuit's test, a problem
with the disfavored group analysis created by case law is that it is outside the
bounds of judicial authority. Congress is given great discretion in the area of
immigration. 67 In the case of asylum, it has passed much of its broad authority
to the immigration agencies. It was the DHS's predecessor agency, the INS,
that articulated the well-founded fear standard, and any changes to the standard
should be promulgated by the DHS. 68 Although the Ninth Circuit may have
had in mind the humanitarian interest that should guide asylum law when it
formulated the disfavored group analysis, the court was acting beyond the
scope of its authority.
This Note recommends a two-fold approach for addressing the problems
with the disfavored group analysis. First, the DHS should articulate a clear
two-step test that allows well-founded fear to be based on membership in a
disfavored group combined with some corresponding level of individual risk.
The asylum applicant will sustain his burden of proving a well-founded fear of
persecution if: (1) He establishes that he is a member of a disfavored group in
167. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713-14 (1893) ("The power of
[C]ongress, therefore, like the power to exclude aliens, or any specified class of aliens, from the
country, may be exercised entirely through the executive officers . ").
168. See Aliens and Nationality; Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Procedures, 55
Fed. Reg. 30,674-01 (July 27, 1990) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 3, 103, 208, 236, 242, and 253)
(specifying that the rule establishing asylum procedures is promulgated by the INS of the
Department of Justice).
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his country of nationality that is oppressed on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion but
that does not face a pattern of persecution; and (2) he establishes an individual
risk of persecution beyond that faced by other members of the disfavored group
of which he is a member, which corresponds conversely to his risk based on
group membership. Though the language of this test still renders it somewhat
ambiguous, it is clearer and more defined than the imprecise disfavored group
analysis that has been developed through case law.
Second, it should be the DHS together with the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) 16 9 that adds
this two-step test, through appropriate procedure under the Administrative
Procedure Act,17 to the procedural guidelines for asylum claims found in the
CFR. The test should be added to 8 C.F.R. § 213(b)(2)(iii) to provide a third
avenue for proving well-founded fear of persecution other than individual risk
or membership in a systematically persecuted group. 17' There are two
advantages to implementing this test as an agency rule rather than as court-
created common law. First, it will provide for uniformity across the United
169. While the USCIS is the agency that adjudicates affirmative asylum claims, the EOIR,
an agency within the DOJ, continues to adjudicate removal proceedings where asylum and
withholding of removal will arise in defensive claims. See 6 U.S.C. § 291 (2000 & Supp. II
2002) (dissolving the INS of the DOJ). The DHS only took over the responsibilities of the INS,
but the DOJ maintained its authority over removal procedures. Id.
170. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000).
171. With the proposed addition, 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) will read:
The applicant may qualify as a refugee either because he or she has suffered past
persecution or because he or she has a well-founded fear of future persecution....
(2) Well-founded fear of persecution.... (iii) In evaluating whether the applicant
has sustained the burden of proving that he or she has a well-founded fear of
persecution, the asylum officer or immigration judge shall not require the applicant
to provide evidence that there is a reasonable possibility he or she would be singled
out individually for persecution if: (A) Membership in a persecuted group: (I) The
applicant establishes that there is a pattern or practice in his or her country of
nationality or, if stateless, in his or her country of last habitual residence, of
persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion; and (II) The applicant establishes his or her own inclusion in, and
identification with, such group of persons such that his or her fear of persecution
upon return is reasonable; or (B) Membership in a disfavored group: (I) The
applicant establishes that he is a member of a disfavored group in his country of
nationality that is oppressed on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion but that does not face a pattern of
persecution; and (II) The applicant establishes an individual risk of persecution
beyond that faced by other members of the disfavored group of which he is a
member, which corresponds conversely to his risk based on group membership.
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States. Uniformity through jurisprudence will require that an asylum claim
challenging a refusal to apply the disfavored group analysis be heard by the
Supreme Court, and this is unlikely given the recent certiorari denials of this
issue. Uniformity has not necessarily been a paramount concern in asylum law;
asylum is in fact notorious for inconsistency.'72 A consistent application of a
test that recognizes well-founded fear where there is a combination of
membership in a disfavored group and some individual risk will improve
consistency in adjudications of asylum petitions by similarly-situated
applicants. Once a group is consistently recognized as disfavored in a specific
country, petitioners that are members of the disfavored group will face greater
predictability across the United States. Any effort that can be made to enhance
the uniformity of asylum cases is much needed, and USCIS and EOIR should
do all that they can to do so.
Second, establishing the test through the appropriate administrative agency
rather than through the courts is appropriate here. Immigration is historically
an area where the courts have taken a hands-off approach, and the Supreme
Court has given Congress great deference in immigration. 73 Congress passed
its discretion and authority on to the immigration agencies in the specific area
of asylum. 174 It is simply most appropriate that the test this Note recommends
be promulgated through agency rule.
VIII Conclusion
Asylum applicants have faced great disparity in the treatment of their
efforts to prove well-founded fear based on their membership in particular
oppressed groups and the individual risk they face. The cases of Ms. Sael and
Mr. Kho described in Part I show how two similarly situated asylum applicants
172. See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 19, at 302 (asserting that the authors' study of
the success rate of asylum claims within single immigration courts, across the country, and
within single nationality groups shows that there is gross disparity in granting asylum); but see
Stephen H. Legomsky et al., Learning to Live With Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits of
Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REv. 413, 415-16 (2007) (responding to Ramrji-Nogales et al., and
arguing that not only is the lack of consistency in asylum adjudication no cause for concern, but
that consistency is in fact detrimental in asylum claims). Legomsky et al. claimed that
subjectivity is necessary in asylum because of the unique nature of every claim and the
individual experience of each applicant. Id.
173. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713-14 (1893) ("The power of
[C]ongress, therefore, like the power to exclude aliens, or any specified class of aliens, from the
country, may be exercised entirely through the executive officers .... ).
174. See INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2000) (granting the Secretary of Homeland Security and
the Attorney General the authority to grant asylum).
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can be treated differently depending on where they file their claim, simply
because one court applies the disfavored group analysis in asylum cases and the
other does not. This kind of inconsistency is especially cruel in asylum, which
is a humanitarian immigration tool aimed at protecting those aliens who will
face persecution if removed to their countries of nationality. Dispensing of the
disfavored group analysis, however, would be even more cruel, because it
would leave aliens with only two methods to prove well-founded fear of future
persecution: Membership in a systematically persecuted group or individual
risk of persecution. To ameliorate the harshness of the current regulatory
asylum procedures while avoiding the risk of abuse created by a lenient
standard like the Ninth Circuit's disfavored group analysis articulated in
Kotasz, the USCIS and the EOIR should promulgate a rule to add an additional
method of proving well-founded fear. The new two-prong test will require the
applicant to show membership in a disfavored group alongside some
individualized risk of persecution separate from other members of the group.
The addition of the test will provide more clarity in an area of immigration law
that is particularly subjective and uncertain. If the USCIS and EOIR adopt the
test, aliens like Ms. Sael and Mr. Kho will no longer have to hope that they
have chosen the best city to reside in during the pendency of their asylum case,
or hope that they landed in the best circuit for their removal hearing. Ms. Sael
and Mr. Kho will know what they must show to establish well-founded fear of
persecution and obtain asylum. And we will no longer have to see Mr. Kho
sent home while Ms. Sael builds a new life with the protection of the United
States.
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